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The Ammunition You Need to Find Evil and Solve Crime

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Welcome to M-unition, the MANDIANT blog. Here we share our insights about the tools we create and use to find evil and solve crime.

Combat the APT by Sharing Indicators of Compromise

Written by Matt Frazier

At MANDIANT, we value human intelligence – ground-truth, intelligent decision-making and adapting to your enemy’s tactics. Since expert humans can’t be everywhere, we’ve built a means to exchange enough ground-truth and decision-making so security experts can spend more energy applying expertise, less time parsing and pruning stale datasets and leverage their expertise across organizations and between compromises.

Historically, compromise data has been exchanged in CSV or PDFs laden with tables of “known bad” malware information – name, size, MD5 hash values and paragraphs of imprecise descriptions supplemented by ad-hoc exchanges between targets.

MANDIANT, inspired by field pressures, operation after operation, imagined a way to exchange not only indicators of specific compromises but structures which formalize the human-intelligence of decision-making, rules, exceptions, and ongoing adaptability. Our Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) were shaped operationally detecting real-world threats. We help our clients detect the APT right now, and they’re exchanging information about it using IOCs.

Conventional compromise datasets consist of table after table of immediately-stale data capturing few, if any, relationships. An Indicator of Compromise (IOC), however, is a Boolean decision tree that discriminates an indicator from a false-positive, theory from ground truth. What’s more, when you discover an exception or extension to a well-known-IOC you can describe it concisely and proactively, authenticate its source and re-evaluate your existing data to detect new instances of old compromises. This way, as a threat group adapts to your detections, you retain an IOC’s identity and maintain the value of intelligence shared with other targets over time.

Importantly, IOC is industry-standard XML so you already have tools and a community of experts who can comprehend, transform, and leverage new data immediately. Unlike many XML standards however, it’s simple – developed operationally with an eye toward staying adaptable, transformable, and scalable. IOC describes relationships which indicate compromise – this makes the format resilient to new data formats, data sources and decision engines.

At DoD CyberCrime 2010 MANDIANT will formally release this format and tools to leverage it in your investigations today. We’ll have full coverage of the release on M-unition – stay tuned.

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. 26 Jan 10 | Conferences, General | Comments (0)

DOD Cyber Crime: New Audit Viewer/Memoryze

Written by Peter Silberman

MANDIANT is going to be at DOD Cyber Crime this year. Jamie and I have both been heads down for many weeks now working on some pretty cool stuff. We are starting to come up for air and what that means for you is updates to Memoryze and Audit Viewer. We will be releasing new versions of each that coincide with DC3.  I, along with many of my co-workers, will be presenting and attending. My talk abstract is very ambiguous so I thought I’d take a brief second to discuss both the talk and the changes to Audit Viewer and Memoryze.

The talk is going to be interactive. And dammit I don’t care if you don’t want to interact with me. I’m both very convincing, persistent and well…charming! You will feel compelled to join in on this talk. I promise. I know this because I’m bringing bribes… And yes, I’m bringing what you are thinking.

This talk will contain a brief intro to memory analysis, a FAQ etc. We are not going to waste much time on the nitty gritty since most people are not interested in how we chop off the last 12 bits to get a physical offset from a virtual address. I know, you just fell asleep a little.  During this talk I will make a case for why memory analysis is important. I will pull from pervious APT investigations where disk analysis failed and had to be used in conjunction with memory analysis. Finally, we will discuss MANDIANT’s Malware Rating Index (MRI). We will finish with real APT incident demos where I’ll walk through the investigation of an infected system with APT.

Now, a little more about MRI. MRI is a huge update to Audit Viewer.  Instead of going after a fish (malware) with a hook (signatures), I’m going after fish (malware) with a drag net (MRI). The goal of this feature is twofold. First it is going to  help pinpoint specific processes that should be investigated further while attempting to eliminate some of the non-suspicious processes and get them out of the analyst’s way. It’s also designed to try and make APT detection easier. A lot of work went into looking at our samples and how they behave etc, and coming up with definable behaviors that trap those little creatures. MRI is made up of two components. The first component is a definable behavior rule set that is completely customizable. It is made up of three different types of rules:

  • Process Path Verification – allows users to define what processes should be launched from what directories. This triggers on malware that copies and names itself after svchost or other system processes to subdirectories within system folders. For example a default rule is that svchost can only be executed from \windows\system32. Any time we see it running from somewhere else we flag the process.
  • Process User Verification – allows users to define what processes should be running under what users.  This triggers on malware spawning svchost for purposes of unmapping image bases or hiding dlls within spawned svchost. So, for example, if malware copies itself to system32\dllcache and then names itself svchost.exe, you can define a rule saying svchost.exe should be running as local service, network service, or system. When Audit Viewer see svchost running as administrator it gets flagged.
  • Process Handle Inspection – this allows you to define specific rules pertaining to malware or generic behavior. For example a default rule is to flag svchost or iexplore anytime it has a process handle to cmd.exe. There is just no good reason for this to _EVER_ happen. You can also define rules based on specific malware, for example if a3c mutant is present then flag the process as being infected with sality.

All of these features are configurable from the UI by going to operations -> Configure MANDIANT MRI.

The second component of MRI is a process address space scoring mechanism. We will be releasing an update to Memoryze at DC3. The new release will contain bug fixes as well as a new feature called “Verify Digital Signatures.” When this parameter is turned on memoryze will perform a “digital signature check” on all loaded modules. This can only be enabled on live memory analysis. The digital signature check verifies the module on disk is digitally signed. We do a bunch of math and use our Least Frequency of Occurrence to trust modules that aren’t signed but occur in more than X% of processes. Where X is defined by the user. We won’t flag or catch modified binaries in memory. So if a rootkit is doing userland hooking (it should be ashamed) we won’t know about it because we are checking disk to determine if it is digitally signed. There are a lot of reasons why we can’t verify in memory digital signatures.  It might make an interesting blog to detail all the reasons. With that said, this new feature gives us a good working idea of how much of the loaded modules in the process address space are signed and therefore trusted. It’s had fantastic results thus far. I’ve been using it on old incidents to see if we could have sped up results using these new methods. The answer seems to be yes in a lot of cases.

After DC3 I’ll have more blogs detailing how you can use and write better rules for MRI. But for now there will be a default distribution that you can use and modify. Again, like always, Audit Viewer is open source and free. Which means you can see the logic and rules behind MRI. Memoryze is and will stay free.

If you are going to be at DC3 and want to grab a beer I will be there from Sun (night)-Weds. Unfortunately I’m going to be missing all the great talks on Thurs so I can leave to compete in the Tough Guy Challenge. You are more than welcome to join at this race in Northern England. As I understand it there are still some open slots! See everyone at DC3!

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. 21 Jan 10 | Conferences | Comments (0)

M-Trends: Advanced Persistent Threat Malware

Written by Wendi Rafferty

There are a lot of reports in the news about the types of malware being utilized by the Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attackers.  Our upcoming release of M-Trends will go into great detail about the types of malware, its capabilities, and how the attackers leverage a variety of malware throughout a breadth of victim organizations to accomplish very specific goals.   Over the next week, the MANDIANT blog will feature excerpts from our upcoming M-Trends report that illustrate just how difficult it is to identify APT techniques.

The most significant commonality of APT malware is that it hides in plain sight. It avoids detection by using common network ports, process injection and Windows service persistence.  Every piece of APT malware cataloged by MANDIANT initiated only outbound network connections.  No sample listened for inbound connections.  So, unless an enterprise network is specifically monitoring outbound network traffic for APT-related anomalies, it will not identify the APT malware outbound beaconing attempts.

A few of the most poignant stats about APT malware are listed below:

APT Malware:

  • Average File Size: 121.85 KB

Most Common APT Filenames:

  • svchost.exe (most common)
  • iexplore.exe
  • iprinp.dll
  • wiinzf32.dll

APT Malware avoids anomaly detection through:

  • Outbound HTTP connections
  • Process injection
  • Service persistence

APT Malware Communication:

  • 100% of APT backdoors made only outbound connections
    • 83% used TCP port 80 or 443
    • 17% used another port

Because APT malware is so difficult to detect, simple malware signatures such as MD5 hashes, filenames, and traditional anti-virus methods usually yield a low rate of true positives.  M-Trends will provide detailed information about how exactly organizations can posture themselves for success when fighting attackers with such specialized and sophisticated capabilities.

If you’d like to register for a copy of “M-Trends,” drop us a note at info(at)mandiant(dot)com otherwise, keep your eyes peeled to our blog  and http://www.mandiant.com for the official release of “M-Trends.”

Special Thanks to Peter Silberman, the MANDIANT malware analysis team, and product engineers for their work in developing this information.

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. 15 Jan 10 | General | Comments (0)

M-Trends: The Advance of the Persistent Threat

Written by Wendi Rafferty

The Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) is an advanced persistent reality!   It’s all over the news.  Everyone seems to be either talking about it or affected by it.  MANDIANT defines the APT as a group of sophisticated, persistent, and coordinated attackers that have been systematically compromising U.S. government and commercial computer networks for years.  The vast majority of APT activity observed by MANDIANT has been linked to China.

MANDIANT has over seven years experience conducting Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) intrusion investigations for the U.S. government, the defense industrial base and commercial organizations.  During that time, we’ve learned many things, and we want to share our lessons learned with the security community.  A team of our APT experts has been working diligently on a report that we call “M-Trends.”   M-Trends focuses on what the APT attackers do and how they do it.

Some highlights from “M-Trends” include:

  • The APT isn’t just a government problem; it isn’t just a defense contractor problem; and it isn’t just a military problem. The APT is everyone’s problem.
  • No target is too small, or too obscure, or too well-defended. No organization is too large, too well-known, or too vulnerable. It’s not spy-versus-spy espionage. It’s spy-versus-everyone.
  • Classic “prevent and detect” techniques do not effectively counter the APT. The attackers can easily defeat normal defenses. They successfully evade anti-virus software, network intrusion detection and under-equipped incident responders. They use sophisticated techniques to conceal their presence: hiding malware on their target’s own hosts and exfiltrating data in its own network traffic.   A staggering 100% of APT malware identified by MANDIANT made ONLY outbound connections from victim networks, 83% of which used TCP port 80 or 443.
  • The APT’s goals are twofold:
    • to steal information to achieve economic, political and strategic advantage.
    • to establish and maintain an occupying force in their target’s environment, a force they can call on at any time. When the APT wants additional data from a target, they don’t need to re-establish a presence. They simply call on their existing assets, locate, steal and exfiltrate the data they need.

We will introduce “M-Trends” at a launch party during the 2010 DoD Cyber Crime conference in St. Louis, MO.  The report authors will be there to answer your questions and share their knowledge.  If you’ll be in St. Louis stop by and see us on Wednesday, January 27 from 6- 9 in the Crystal Ballroom at the Renaissance Grand.

Register for a copy of “M-Trends” and keep your eyes peeled to our blog  and http://www.mandiant.com for the official release of “M-Trends.”

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. 14 Jan 10 | General | Comments (0)

MANDIANT in Miami at the SCADA Security Scientific Symposium

Written by Kris Harms

On January 20th, I’ll be keynoting the SCADA Security Scientific Symposium (S4).  I’m lucky enough to escape the cold DC weather. Unfortunately Miami is also getting some of the coldest weather in its history, but it will be a great conference anyway. Thanks to Richard Bejtlich for putting Dale Peterson and me in touch.

My talk will discuss the Advanced Persistent Threat.  I will be walking attendees through APT intrusions from compromise to remediation.  Throughout the talk, I will provide a few demos and will dive deep into the forensic techniques our investigators use in the field.

I’ll even be showing a sneak peek of the M-TRENDS report that provides statistics and intelligence gathered by MANDIANT investigators on all Advanced Persistent Threat cases we have worked.  A lot of hard work has gone into developing this report and its data so it’s sure to enlighten even the most experienced APT investigators.  More on M-TRENDS to come so stay tuned to the blog and our website.

If you’re lucky enough to call Miami home, or will be at the [S4] conference, shoot me an email to talk shop while I am down there.   kris.harms (at) MANDIANT (dot) com

See you there!

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. 09 Jan 10 | Conferences | Comments (0)

AFCEA Cyberspace 2010

Written by Helena Brito

Come chat with us next week at Defending America, CYBERSPACE 2010 Symposium, January 12-14, held at the Broadmoor Hotel in Colorado Springs, CO.

Between informational sessions on the latest cyberspace issues, stop by MANDIANT’s booth (#51) to speak with our knowledgeable staff and gain insight into how we differ in response to cyber security incidents. Don’t forget to grab a souvenir stress ball once we have answered all your questions!

Booth Staff:

• Kevin Albano – Consultant
• Michael J. Graven – Director
• Tim Treat – Program Manager

. 06 Jan 10 | General | Comments (0)
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